[EM] Does MAM use the Copeland method?
Adam Tarr
atarr at purdue.edu
Wed Oct 6 12:29:51 PDT 2004
Paul Kislanko wrote:
>I merely observe from the original ballots that 5 of 9 voters prefer C over
>A. So those are the ones who will be unhappy if A is elected.
>
>That majority will initiate a referndum that changes the voting method
>because it selected the "wrong" candidate from the VOTERS perspective.
The fact that a majority can prefer a defeated candidate to the winner is
an unavoidable consequence of Condorcet's paradox. It also happened when
using plurality in 2000, as you may recall.
>You academics can say A is right, but if that is so, this just demonstrates
>that Plurality does as well as anything.
The fact that no election method is perfect does not imply that none are
better than others. It's simply a question of what you consider important.
-Adam
P.S. Steve, maybe it's just me but I can't link to your webpage at the
moment. I was hoping to re-read your Immunity from Majority Complaints
criterion.
And for the record, Steve's MAM is probably my favorite method, although
any winning-votes Condorcet method based on sequential dropping or beat
paths or ranked pairs would be just as good in the vast majority of large
public elections. The far more significant distinction (within that class
of methods) is what ballot you use. I'm personally partial to ABCDF graded
ballots, with "E" being the default grade for unranked candidates.
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