[EM] Approval and Myerson-Weber Equilibrium

MIKE OSSIPOFF nkklrp at hotmail.com
Sat Nov 20 20:04:40 PST 2004

I neglected to mention:

With Approval, if a party is at the voter-median position, it's the only 
party that can win at Myerson-Weber equilibrium.

That's why I say that Approval will quickly home in on the vote-median, and 
then stay there.

Why is that good? For one thing, the voter median candidate is the CW and 
the  social utility maximizer. And it's been shown that, in general,  the CW 
tends to be the social utulity maximizer. Greatest good for greatest number. 
So that's an argument for Condorcet too.

Why does social utility (SU) matter?:

Say we're talking about elections at some time in the future. We don't know 
what the candidate lineup will be, what kind of an examples the elections 
will be, or where you'll be in those examples.

Your espectation in those future elections is no better than the SU that can 
be expected of the winners. No better than the SU quality of the voting 
system that will be used in those future elections. So propose methods that 
do well by SU.

I consider the majority defensive strategy criteria, and the goal of getting 
rid of the lesser-of-2-evils problem, important too.  But the methods that 
do well by those criteria are the ones that well at SU because of going to 
the voter-median, the CW.

Mike Ossipoff

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