[EM] difficulty of interpersonal comparisons in utility

Kevin Venzke stepjak at yahoo.fr
Mon May 24 00:35:00 PDT 2004


Brian,

 --- Brian Olson <bql at bolson.org> a écrit : > 
> >> Well said. This argument goes back at least as far as the canonical
> >> work by Kenneth Arrow. In laying the axioms on which his conclusions
> >> lay, he argued that you can't compare utility _between_ people.
> >>
> >> I say otherwise. We do implicitly compare utility between people. We
> >> declare them all to be equal. That's why the ideal has been "One Man,
> >> One Vote". (Unless you're a shareholder where the system is 'one 
> >> share,
> >> one vote')
> >
> > Do you mean to say that everybody being equal shows that we implicitly
> > compare utility between people?  And that this shows that election 
> > methods
> > can do so?
> 
> Yes, we implicitly balance interpersonal utility.

Yes, you already said that.  My question is: what does "One Man, One Vote" have 
to do with comparing utility between people?

> An election method could do so providing it had some way of recording a 
> person's utility and provided that they have accurate self-knowledge, 
> accurate knowledge of the options available, and 
> incentive to record their utility honestly on the ballot.
  ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

Isn't the inability to find such an incentive the reason why one would
argue that we can't compare utility between people?

Kevin Venzke
stepjak at yahoo.fr



	

	
		
Yahoo! Mail : votre e-mail personnel et gratuit qui vous suit partout ! 
Créez votre Yahoo! Mail sur http://fr.benefits.yahoo.com/

Dialoguez en direct avec vos amis grâce à Yahoo! Messenger !Téléchargez Yahoo! Messenger sur http://fr.messenger.yahoo.com



More information about the Election-Methods mailing list