[EM] Re: Efforts to Improve on CR's Strategy
Brian Olson
bql at bolson.org
Thu May 20 20:29:02 PDT 2004
On May 20, 2004, at 6:03 PM, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
> Here's a conceptual example that I think better illustrates the problem
> that I observed. Suppose you vote in an election in which there are 6
> candidates and you have no idea how anyone else votes. Your sincere CR
> profile for candidates A ... F is
> SincereCR: A(0.7), B(0.5), C(0.3), D(0.1), E(-0.1), F(-0.3)
> (This assumes signed CR's, with an approval cutoff of zero.) What I
> call
> "ExaggerateCR" simply applies a linear transformation so that the max
> and min CR's are +1 and -1:
>
> I reply:
>
> If you do anything other than mutliplying all of a particular voter's
> ratings by the same factor, then you'll get something that's
> meaningless.
I think the operation being applied to each rating of a voter is
f(r) = m * r + b
By choosing m and b for voter, the highest rating scales to 1.0, the
lowest to -1.0 and everything else proportionally in between.
> And if you multiply different voter's ratings by different factors,
> then you don't have a valid CR count. Not that you're necessarily
> doing a CR count.
It's not straight-CR, but it's still useful. I'd say it makes sure
everyone has the same voting strategy for CR, which adds a measure of
fairness. This particular variation can still be taken advantage of.
The proper vote is 1.0 for all choices with positive utility and -1.0
for all others. That maximizes my expected utility. But, the experiment
as I understand it was applying various voting systems to honest
preferences.
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
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