[EM] Efforts to improve on CR's strategy

[Ken Johnson]

>From: "MIKE OSSIPOFF" <nkklrp at hotmail.com>
>Date: Mon, 17 May 2004 01:04:39 +0000
>
>
>Ken Johnson wrote:
>
>As
>I understand it, the main problem with CR is that it is strategically
>equivalent to Approval.
>
>I reply:
>
>That might be a problem to those who don't like Approval. But to those of us 
>who like Approval, CR's strategic equivalence to Approval isn't a problem. 
>It's what makes CR one of the best methods.
>
>...
>
>Mike Ossipoff
>
>  
>
Mike,

I was, until recently, a fanatical advocate of Approval. I tried to 
demonstrate by empirical simulation the superiority of Approval over 
rank methods, based on the criterion that the election method should 
maximize "social utility" as defined by sincere CR. (See my earlier post 
in Election-methods digest, Vol 1 #597, Message 4.) Unfortunately, it 
didn't turn out the way I expected. In a single-issue election with many 
candidates, Approval exhibited abysmal performance, worse than all other 
methods (including Plurality). So I gave up my crusade. Oh well.

Ken