[EM] IRV's "majority winner". What if we let the people choose?
Ken Taylor
taylok2 at alum.rpi.edu
Mon May 17 04:57:02 PDT 2004
Sorry, but this inspired my sleep deprived brain. Has anyone noticed that
many of the discussions on this list follow a familiar pattern? To wit:
Anti-IRVer: Here is an example that proves that IRV does not select the same
answer as Condorcet, therefore it is highly inferior to Condorcet, which
*does* select the same answer as Condorcet!
Pro-IRVer: No, you've got it wrong! We're not really sure, exactly, *what*
IRV picks, but we're darned sure that whatever it picks is better than
Condorcet!
Approvaler: Will you two stop bickering and see the light? Not only does
approval voting pick the exact correct answer in every situation, but it
also will do all your household chores for you, and it cures cancer!
Just meant to be humorous. Hope I didn't offend :)
Ken
----- Original Message -----
From: "Bart Ingles" <bartman at netgate.net>
To: "EM List" <election-methods at electorama.com>
Sent: Sunday, May 16, 2004 11:42 PM
Subject: Re: [EM] IRV's "majority winner". What if we let the people choose?
>
> James Gilmour wrote:
> >
> > Now consider:
> > 49 A<C<B
> > 48 B<C<A
> > 3 C<B<A
> > IRV winner = B; CW winner = C.
> > I doubt very much whether most electors would accept C as the "winner"
> > if this were an election for State Governor, much less for a directly
> > elected President of the USA. If anyone has evidence to the contrary
I'd
> > like very much to see it.
>
> Whether C has widespread acceptability depends almost entirely on
> information which is not captured in ranked ballots. At the extremes, C
> may enjoy either unanimous popularity, or near total rejection.
> Approval voting is able to distinguish between these extreme cases with
> ease. Ranked methods can only do so to the extent that they encourage
> insincere strategy.
>
> Bart Ingles
> ----
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