[EM] Desirability of the majority defensive strategy criteria

MIKE OSSIPOFF nkklrp at hotmail.com
Tue May 25 19:05:01 PDT 2004


If a majority would rather elect X than Y, then, if we're going to elect X 
or Y, it should be X.
No one would disagree with that.

The above statements doesn't necessarily mean that X should win (maybe 
neither X nor Y wins). But it does mean that Y shouldn't win.

It's just a question of what the members of that majority have to do in 
order to assure that.

With nearly all methods, they sometimes need to bury their favorite in order 
to keep Y from winning.

The majority defensive strategy criteria are about what a majorilty who 
prefer X to Y shouldn't have to do in order to keep Y from winning.

For some time, I was using 4 majority defensive strategy criteria: SFC, 
GSFC, WDSC & SDSC.

Recently I've added 4 more: ESC, SSFC, SGSFC, and SSSD.

The initial 4 are met by unehnanced Condorcet wv versions. And WDSC is also 
met by Approval and CR. The 2nd 4 are met by enhanced Condorcet wv methods. 
Enhanced by AERLO, ATLO, or RMDD.
Here I'm using RMDD as the name of an enhancement, and also as the name of 
the enhanced method.

So, listing the 8 majority defensive strategy criteria together:

SFC, GSFC, WDSC, SDSC, ESC, SSFC, SGSFC, and SSSD.

Mike Ossipoff

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