[EM] Some unfortunately too strong Defensive Strategy Criterion

[Markus Schulze]

Dear Jobst,

you wrote (1 May 2004):
> Criterion:
> Suppose that, with all voters voting sincerely, the method elects A, but
> some voter prefers B to A and can get B elected by voting insincerely.
> Then those voters not preferring B to A must have a way of voting which
> ensures that A or some option C gets elected which the first voter ranks
> *below* A, so that either the sincere result can be guaranteed or the
> incentive to vote insincerely is removed.

In the scientific literature, election methods with this property
are called "strategyproof with counterstrategies". Especially
Prasanta K. Pattanaik wrote many papers about this topic.

Markus Schulze