[EM] Efforts to improve on CR's strategy

[Ken Johnson]

>Date: Thu, 27 May 2004 21:31:18 -0700
>From: Bart Ingles <bartman at netgate.net>
>
>Ken Johnson wrote:
>  
>
>>>Date: Mon, 24 May 2004 21:55:40 -0700
>>>From: Bart Ingles <bartman at netgate.net>
>>>...
>>>IRNR seems equivalent to repeated runoff elections.  In a zero-info
>>>election with five candidates, where my preferences are A>B>C>D>E, I
>>>would vote something like:
>>>
>>>A(1.0) > B(0.001) > C(0.000001) > D(0.000000001) > E(0.0)
>>>
>>>The idea is that subsequent ratings are low enough that they don't
>>>detract much from my first-choice vote in each round.  And if my first
>>>choice is ever eliminated, the bulk of my voting power always goes to my
>>>highest remaining choice.
>>>
>>>...
>>>
>>>      
>>>
>>Bart,
>>
>>It seems to me that a limitation of this strategy is that if candidate A
>>is left standing in the last round, then you have very little say in who
>>A is running against. What if you have very high, and nearly equal,
>>sincere ratings of A, B, C, and D, and a very low rating for E? Your
>>highest priority is to ensure that E is eliminated. What then would be
>>your strategy?
>>    
>>
>
>The same.  ...
>  
>
Bart,

Let's look at this in simpler terms. Suppose my ONLY objective is to 
eliminate E. I have no preference between A, B, C, and D. Consider the 
following two IRNR strategy options:
(1) A(1.0) > B(0.001) > C(0.000001) > D(0.000000001) > E(0.0)
(2) A(1.0) = B(1.0) = C(1.0) = D(1.0) > E(0.0)
Can you illustrate a situation in which the first strategy, but not the 
second, would result in E's defeat?

More generally, if my preferences are A>B>C>D>E, what would be wrong 
with the following strategy?

A(1.0) > B(0.999999999) > C(0.999999) > D(0.999) > E(0.0)

The ideas is that the ratings other than the last are close enough that 
they don't detract much from by last-choice vote in each round. And if 
my last choice is ever eliminated, the bulk of my (negative) voting 
power always goes to my lowest remaining choice.

Ken Johnson

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