[EM] RMDD is feasible, if sometimes awkward. SSSC & SSFC are feasibly attainable.

[MIKE OSSIPOFF]

On EM we've discussed the fact that, if everyone is majority-beaten  (or 
loses an up/down vote), the method could return zero winners, and a new 
election could be thereby mandated.

That could be part of RMDD's rules:

Ranked Majority Defeat Disqualification (RMDD):

Balloting: Rank balloting
A voter can rank as many or as few candidates as s/she wants to.
Equal ranking and truncation are allowed.

A candidate loses if another candidate is ranked over hir by a majority of 
all the voters.

If there are more than 1 winner, the tie is solved by one of the Condorcet 
wv versions.

If there are zero winners, then all the candidates are disqualified, and a 
new election, with new candidates, must be held.

(To avoid any claim that the incumbant has been effectively re-elected, the 
new election would have to be very prompt).

[end of RMDD definition]

As I said in an earlier method, RMDD meets SSSC & SSFC:

Strong Sincere Strategy Criterion (SSSC):

If a majority of all the voters prefer X to Y, and vote sincerely, then Y 
shouldn't win.

[end of SSSC definition)

Strong Strategy-Free Criterion (SSFC):

If a majority of all the voters prefer the CW to Y, and vote sincerely, then 
Y shouldn't win.

[end of SSFC definiition]

Of course if the election is between several alternatives, and those 
alternatives are the only ones conceivable--say that there are only 3 ways 
to do something, and we're voting among those--then of course RMDD can't be 
used, and SSSD is unattainable.

But, for electing a candidate, RMDD is feasible, if sometimes a little 
inconvenient. And therefore SSSD and SSFC are feasibly attainable.

Mike Ossipoff

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