[EM] approval voting and majority criterion

[Ken Johnson]

>   Date: Mon, 15 Mar 2004 13:55:34 -0500
>   From: Eric Gorr <eric at ericgorr.net>
>
>  
>
>>... suppose the CR profile with a third 
>>candidate C is as follows,
>>55%: A=99, B=100, C=0
>>45%: A=99, B=0, C=100
>>Now, unless the B supporters know for sure that they are a majority, 
>>they will vote sincerely and the election will go to candidate A, 
>>who has the strong, unanimous approval of all voters. This is 
>>arguably not a bad outcome.
>>    
>>
>
>Interestingly enough, A is the Condorcet winner as well, since these 
>ballots could reasonably be interpreted as:
>
>55: B>A>C
>45: C>A>B
>
>...
>
I thought the Condorcet winner must have a majority over every other 
candidate. Although a majority prefers A over C, A would not win over B. 
Isn't B the Condorcet winner?

Ken Johnson