[EM] dissatisfying Strong FBC methods

[Kevin Venzke]

Alex,

 --- Alex Small <asmall at physics.ucsb.edu> a écrit : 
> An example of a method that satisfies strong FBC (the only strictly
> ranked method that does for 3 candidates, to the best of my knowledge)
> is “Negative Voting”:  You indicate your preference order, and the
> method assigns one vote apiece to your favorite and middle candidates,
> and no vote to your least favorite.  This still violates the “spirit” of
> strong FBC, however, because it doesn’t give any special status to your
> favorite.

I don't agree that this method should be considered to meet strong FBC.  I
think we can safely declare that it fails it, because even when the ballot
A>B>C is the sole ballot in the election, the result is not an A victory but
an AB tie.

We could modify the method to break such ties by counting first preferences,
but then of course there would be order-reversal incentive.

Also, if people aren't convinced by a demonstration that a Strong FBC method
must be inferior to Approval, the incompatibility of Strong FBC with Majority
is pretty convincing, I think.

Nice work.  I wish I could understand all of it better.

Kevin Venzke
stepjak at yahoo.fr



	

	
		
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