[EM] Falsifying voters' rankings

MIKE OSSIPOFF nkklrp at hotmail.com
Thu Mar 25 16:37:26 PST 2004


Dave Ketchum wrote:
"
BTW - I do see "=" for equal - and equality among several candidates.
Since, at any instant, Condorcet is only concerned with a single pair,
more equality does not make more complexity.  Two voters voting A=B A=B
should net the same results as voting A>B and A<B."

I reply:

It should? That's called a "rules criterion": A voting system should have a 
csertain kind of rules, because I say so."

Aside from the fact that your rules criterion requires falsification of 
preferences, falsification of people's rankings, it results in the violation 
of a number of _results_ criteria.

Falsifying voters' rankings violates an obvious fundamental standard. The 
results criteria then violated
measure for, and are justified by, the fundamental standards of majority 
rule and getting rid of the lesser-of-2-evils problems.

We've discussed this lots of times on EM. Examples were posted in which your 
falsification of preferences results in majority rule violations.

Of course the only people for whom it makes sense to write the rules for 
Condorcet are the Condorcet proponents. Better you write the rules for your 
method proposal instead of mine.

For instance, you could define "Falsified Preference Condorcet", and write 
its rules however you want to.

Mike Ossipoff

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