[EM] Re: please read a quick question about Condorcet

[Chris Benham]

Dave,
You wrote  (Sat.20-3-04):

"On Thu, 18 Mar 2004 18:26:39 -0800 James Green-Armytage wrote:

> Hi folks,
> 	I was just wondering what sort of Condorcet tally methods have been
> proposed to process ballots that are not only ranked, but where some
> preferences are indicated as being stronger than others. For example, a
> vote may look like this:
> 
> Kucinich > Nader >> Dean >> Kerry > Edwards >> Clark >>> Lieberman >>>>
> Bush
> 
> 	For example, I have heard of one where, if there is a majority rule
> cycle, the lowest-priority preferences on each ballot are changed to
> equalities. I'm wondering if anything else has been proposed along these
> lines. 
> 
> thank you!
> James
> 
Seems to me that, for Condorcet, noticing a difference between ">" and ">>" 

introduces headaches beyond any possible public election value:"

I don't really agree with this. I think that if we stick with strict Condorcet compliance,
then making some use of ratings information could be a good way out of the Condorcet paradox.
The method that James G-A refers to is one I posted 14-9-03, that uses ratings ballots.

"Condorcet completed by Compressing Ranks:

1.CR  ballots, voters give each candidate a score out of  100 ( or any 
other round number that is much greater than the number of candidates.)

2. Inferring the rankings from the ratings, elect the CW is there is 
one.  If not, then eliminate the non-members of the Schwartz set.

3.Those ballots which show as many preference-levels among the remaining 
candidates as there are remaining candidates (N) are now converted to 
ballots showing (N-1) preferences by disregarding the smallest gap in 
the scores of adjacently ranked remaining candidates. If there is a tie 
for "smallest gap" , then disregard the tied gap between the highest 
adjacent preferences among the remaining candidates.

4. Inferring rankings from these ballots (amended so that none show more 
than N-1 preference-levels), elect the CW if there is one.  If not , 
eliminate non-members of the Schwartz set, repeat step 3 and so on.


An equivalent version which is easier to hand-count but less natural and 
more awkward to vote is to have the voters rank the candidates and also 
rank the the gaps in utility  between the adjacently-ranked candidates, 
from largest to smallest."

Dave Ketchum wrote:
"BTW - I do see "=" for equal - and equality among several candidates. 
Since, at any instant, Condorcet is only concerned with a single pair, 
more equality does not make more complexity.  Two voters voting A=B A=B 
should net the same results as voting A>B and A<B."

I agree completely with this. What is your preferred Condorcet completion method?

Chris Benham





 


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