[EM] Re: [Fwd: approval voting and majority criterion]
Steve Eppley
seppley at alumni.caltech.edu
Wed Mar 17 20:07:01 PST 2004
Ken Johnson wrote:
> Forest Simmons wrote:
-snip-
> >A more fundamental goal might be to go with the choice that
> >would be acceptable to the greatest number of voters.
>
> That sounds like Approval. The method follows directly and
> obviously from the statement of the goal, no formal proof
> required.
-snip-
Except it's not obvious what "acceptable" means. It's not
defined in the rational choice theory model of individual
preferences, nor do I see how to derive it within that model.
Furthermore, I see no reason to believe that "sincere
acceptability" would have anything to do with the voting
strategies actually employed. Each voter would have a clear
incentive to approve their most preferred candidate, regardless
of whether that candidate is sincerely acceptable, and would
have a clear incentive to not approve their least preferred
candidate, regardless of whether that candidate is sincerely
acceptable, etc.
--Steve
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