[EM] Re: [Fwd: approval voting and majority criterion]

Steve Eppley seppley at alumni.caltech.edu
Wed Mar 17 20:07:01 PST 2004


Ken Johnson wrote:
> Forest Simmons wrote:
-snip-
> >A more fundamental goal might be to go with the choice that 
> >would be acceptable to the greatest number of voters.
>
> That sounds like Approval. The method follows directly and 
> obviously from the statement of the goal, no formal proof
> required.
-snip-

Except it's not obvious what "acceptable" means.  It's not 
defined in the rational choice theory model of individual 
preferences, nor do I see how to derive it within that model.

Furthermore, I see no reason to believe that "sincere 
acceptability" would have anything to do with the voting 
strategies actually employed.  Each voter would have a clear 
incentive to approve their most preferred candidate, regardless 
of whether that candidate is sincerely acceptable, and would 
have a clear incentive to not approve their least preferred 
candidate, regardless of whether that candidate is sincerely 
acceptable, etc.

--Steve




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