[EM] equal rankings IRV

James Green-Armytage jarmyta at antioch-college.edu
Sun Jun 13 16:45:02 PDT 2004


Dave Ketchum <davek at clarityconnect.com> writes:
>For what follows voting is:
>  1 X (A or B or C)
>  3 D
>  3 T (troublemakers)
>Without equal rankings T votes are scattered to A, B, C, and D wins
>With equal rankings whole votes, T votes are A=B=C and the X vote defines 
>the winner (who gets 4 votes).
>With equal rankings fractional votes, T votes are A=B=C and D wins.


Dave,
	I'm sorry, but I don't understand your example. It does not seem to make
sense. I must be missing something. Are you imagining three different sets
of ballots as follows:

1: A
3: A=B=C>D
3: D>A=B=C

1: B
3: A=B=C>D
3: D>A=B=C

1: C
3: A=B=C>D
3: D>A=B=C

	Is that the idea? And if equal rankings were not allowed, then the 3
A=B=C>D voters would vote something like A>B>C>D, B>C>A>D, and C>A>B>D?
	I found the format of your example very confusing. Could you please use
the more generally agreed-upon format of EM list examples as above?

	If my guess as to your meaning above is correct, then I think that you
have made an error in your calculations. D will not win any of these
examples with standard IRV or either of the equal rankings versions. This
is because the set {A, B, C} has a mutual majority of the vote (4/7).
	I'm sorry, I don't understand your point.

best,
James





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