[EM] IMHO, IRV superior to approval

[wclark at xoom.org]

Chris Benham wrote:

> Initial two candidate election (with ratings out of ten).
> 01: A(9)>>B(1)
> 99: B(8)>>A(7)

> B wins 99 to 1. Now we add a third candidate X, which all the
> voters rank adjacently to A, and who therfore meets the Blake
> Cretney definition of a clone of A.  Same voters and initial 2
> candidates, but with a third candidate added.

> 01:A(9)>>X(2)>B(1)
> 99:B(8)>A(7)>>X(1)

Why not (as Adam Tarr has also suggested:)

01:A(9)>>X(2)>B(1)
99:B(8)>>A(7)>X(1)

or:

01:A(9)>X(2)>>B(1)
99:B(8)>>A(7)>X(1)

Also, if A and X are supposed to be clones, I find it somewhat odd that
the voters rate them so differently.

Is the Blake Cretney definition only meant for rank methods?  A and X
don't seem to satisfy the "spirit" of what it means to be a clone, since
they basically have nothing in common -- not even whether they're voted
the same way by even a single voter.

> A wins 100 to 99. So adding a clone of A, which ALL the voters
> ranked last, changed A from a 1/100 loser to the winner.

The A-voter doesn't rank X last (not that it really matters.)

-wclark

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