[EM] IMHO, IRV superior to approval
Adam Tarr
atarr at purdue.edu
Sun Jun 6 13:16:02 PDT 2004
Chris Benham wrote:
>Initial two candidate election (with ratings out of ten).
>01: A(9)>>B(1)
>99: B(8)>>A(7)
>
>B wins 99 to 1. Now we add a third candidate X, which all the voters rank
>adjacently to A, and who
>therfore meets the Blake Cretney definition of a clone of A.
>Same voters and initial 2 candidates, but with a third candidate added.
>01:A(9)>>X(2)>B(1)
>99:B(8)>A(7)>>X(1)
>
>A wins 100 to 99. So adding a clone of A, which ALL the voters ranked
>last, changed A from a 1/100 loser to the winner.
Why would the B faction vote for A in the second example? There's nothing
"dishonest" about them only voting for B, which is exactly what they
should, and almost certainly would, do.
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