[EM] Pseudo-election reform in California

[Dr. Ernie Prabhakar]

Hi all,

On Jun 1, 2004, at 3:38 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
> Recent French elections demonstrated need for something better than  
> Plurality plus rerun.  I believe they also demonstrated that IRV does  
> not cut it - IRV too easily locks out acceptable candidates when  
> minorities each rate a few minor candidates as best.
>
> To me this leads to Condorcet, using computer-based voting and  
> counting. We should advise careful use of Condorcet in a single pass  
> election - that it needs neither primaries nor reruns.

Someone sent me the following off list (and asked it be forwarded  
anonymously):

1. Approval
> This has been suggested elsewhere (can't find the reference at the  
> moment
> ...).  Use Approval Voting on the first ballot, cut off the top N
> highest-approved candidates.  The suggestion I've seen is the top 5
> candidates, then use Condorcet for the general election.
> See this post, it probably qualifies as the first mention, and  
> includes a nice
> example of usage:
>
> http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/ 
> 2001-May/006053.htm
>
> Incidentally, if the approval cutoff is taken with the top 3  
> candidates, and
> winning votes (not margins) are used, there is essentially no  
> difference
> between Ranked Pairs and Beatpath.  Isn't that attractive?
>
> Top 3 approval allows for the possibility of (say) D & R candidates  
> and one
> strong outsider, or 2 strong candidates from one major party and one  
> from the
> other.  So 3 candidates are not ideal in terms of eliminating the clone
> problem, but in practice, if two of the three strongest approval  
> candidates
> are in one party, that is a pretty good indication that the electorate  
> is
> leaning that way anyway.

2.  STV-PR
> the most recent post to election-methods suggested PR as appropriate  
> for a
> multi-seat election.
>
> I like that idea!  Except I would use 3 seats and then Condorcet for  
> the
> general election.
>
> This might be a good idea for open primaries as well -- the question is
> whether it removes the incentive for members of one party to  
> strategically
> misrank an unelectable opposition party member higher than the more  
> electable
> candidate.  Hmm ...
>
> Okay, on investigating further, I see a better alternative.
>
> Say there are 3 "seats" for the general election, which will be  
> decided by wv
> Condorcet (RP essentially the same as BP in this case).
>
> Single Transferable Proportional Vote is the best way to select them  
> in a PR
> scheme.
>
> Why?  It's because STPV, unlike STV, doesn't have a threshold for  
> winning a
> seat, exactly the criterion we want for a primary election.  It just
> eliminates the lowest first-ranked candidate and redistributes votes.   
> This
> process repeats until 3 candidates remain.  This method also wastes  
> the fewest
> votes.
>
> STPV reduces tactical voting in the primary since one places one's
> most-preferred candidates highest to prevent their elimination.  It is  
> also
> unlikely that, say, a Republican voter would rank a unelectable  
> Democratic
> candidate higher than his/her own favored candidate.

So, I interpret that -- if one assumes the existence of a primary -- as  
recommending STPV-PR for the first round, then a three-candidate  
Condorcet for the final round.

In the California case, if we can't get Condorcet for the general  
election, we'd have to pick two candidates, and it still sounds like  
either Approval or STPV-PR would be the optimal primary.

Thoughts?

-- Ernie P.