[EM] ERIRV

[MIKE OSSIPOFF]

James--

Choosing ERIRV instead of Approval, you're trading FBC for MMC & ICC. And 
you're rid of the co-operation/defection dilemma that you described for 
Approval. For Condorcet, ATLO gets rid of that dilemma. The better Condrocet 
proposals meeet  MMC & ICC, in addition to SFC, GSFC, WDSC, & SDSC.

I've talked about how every MMC situation is an IRV failure example for WDSC 
& FBC. But with ERIRV, that's no longer so, though FBC failures can still be 
found, with a little more work.

Of course it depends on how often and how bad the FBC violation will be, 
but, objectively, for me, ERIRV probably looks more desirable than Approval 
in terms of criteria and strategy.

That's true of both the fractional and whole versions of ERIRV. The more so 
if AERLO is included.

As for whether Approval or ERIRV(fractional) is easier to propose and get 
enacted, I don't know. Any such discussion should include CR too, because CR 
is more familiar than Approval is. I always say that Approval should be 
introduced as CR. Maybe 0-10 CR should be descsribed first, and then 0,1 CR 
(Approval). Find out if people feel ok about 0,1 CR, or if they insist on 
0-10 CR or 0-100 CR.

Somone pointed out a pushover ("turkey-raising") strategy in ERIRV(whole), 
but I feel that the voter should be considered to have a natural right to 
fully support each of several candidates as s/he can in ERIRV(whole). So I'd 
prefer ERIRV(whole) to ERIRV(fractional). But by the criteria that are 
important to me, they're both equal, since they both meet WDSC.

And I repeat that, with the addition of AERLO, ERIRV(fractional) and 
ERIRV(whole) both meet SDSC too.

You wrote:

	Also, I'd like to know if everyone agrees that the whole votes ER-IRV is
preferable to the fractional votes version. I believe that it is, so far.
Basically, the argument is that the whole votes version reduces the
incentive for strategic order-reversal to a greater extent than the
fractional version does.

I reply:

Though I prefer whole to fractional, in principle, I don't know of an 
example where it whole does better than fractional, though there may very 
well be such an example. As I was saying, by the criteria importrant to me, 
they seem equal.

You wrote:

	And last, logically enough, is the fractional version substantially
better than the standard no-equal-rankings-allowed version?

I reply:

Definitely, since it meets WDSC, and, with AERLO, SDSC.


You wrote:

This may come
into play if people are worried about some one person one vote mumbo jumbo
and hence reject the superior (?) whole votes version.

I reply:

Yes, that's why it seems to me that ERIRV(fractional) is better idea for a 
proposal than is              ERIRV(whole).

James G. was expressing the one-person-one-vote (opov) opposition to 
ERIRV(whole). We've talked about opov here. It's a rules-criterion. It's 
advocates never justified it in terms of a results-criterion or an accepted 
fundamentals standard, as they were asked to. They use opov as a fundamental 
standard, though most here would agree that a rules-criterion has no 
validity as a fundamental standard.

If James G. votes only one candidate in 1st place and I vote 3, then yes, 
I've cast 3 times as many 1st place votes as James G. did. Does that mean I 
have 3 times the voting power? No, because James G. likewise had the power 
to vote 3 candidates in 1st place.

And when voting power is defined so that it can vary among voters, it turns 
out that it varies much less in Approval than in Plurality. Approval gives 
us more equal voting power than Plurality does. So much for the opov 
opposition to Approval and ERIRV(whole).

Still, with ERIRV(fractional) we don't even have to reply to opov 
objections, because none are made.

So I suggest that ERIRV(fractional) would be a bettere proposal than 
ERIRV(whole).

IRVists claim that ERIRV(fracational) isn't needed. They're very mistaken 
there. They say they don't think most people would use equal ranking. Fine. 
No one is forced to.

You wrote:


	While some people have experienced an unwillingness to compromise on the
part of IRV supporters, and expect them to reject any future compromises,
hence obliviating the need for IRV compromise methods like ER-IRV... but
my opinion is that there is no harm in offering them. If they are
rejected, then nothing has been lost. I intend to personally offer such a
suggestion to IRV supporters if it can be agreed upon that the method has
merit.

I reply:

Yes, I agree that it's good to make that offer. Maybe the IRVists will 
eventually get tired of always working against the voting system community, 
and might finally accept ERIRV as a mitigation compromise.

I offered several mitigation compromises, including ERIRV(fractional) to the 
IRVists in a posting here a few months ago.

Mike Ossipoff

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