[EM] Is this cyclic preference example not rational? (Was: SFC definition supports partial preference relations)

Dr. Ernie Prabhakar drernie at radicalcentrism.org
Mon Jul 26 13:54:29 PDT 2004


Hi Jobst,

I'm impressed.  I didn't think you could define a coherent B>A>C>B 
situation, but it looks like you did:

On Jul 26, 2004, at 1:06 PM, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
> 	1. Would I prefer the situation
> 		(i)   "A and B tied on top, A elected" or
> 		(ii)  "A and B tied on top, B elected".
> 	2. Would I prefer the situation
> 		(iii) "B and C tied on top, B elected" or
> 		(iv)  "B and C tied on top, C elected".
> 	3. Would I prefer the situation
> 		(v)   "C and A tied on top, C elected" or
> 		(vi)  "C and A tied on top, A elected".

I think the key point you make is that, in fact, the two different 
'tiebreaking' votes *are* in fact taking place under different 
scenarios, even if its at the same time.  Rather like a runoff.

To be fair, I think such situations are relatively rare, and I 
personally wouldn't want to impose that added complexity on voters for 
what I consider a relatively small amount of expressive power.  But, I 
do think it is a valid model, and that "choice functions" could be 
considered an interesting superset of "ranked ballots."

-- Ernie P.
---------------------------------
Ernest N. Prabhakar, Ph.D. <DrErnie at RadicalCentrism.org>
RadicalCentrism.org is an anti-partisan think tank near Sacramento, 
California, dedicated to developing and promoting the ideals of 
Reality, Character, Community and Humility as expressed in our Radical 
Centrist Manifesto: Ground Rules of Civil Society 
<http://RadicalCentrism.org/manifesto.html>



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