[EM] Is this cyclic preference example not rational? (Was: SFC definition supports partial preference relations)
Dr. Ernie Prabhakar
drernie at radicalcentrism.org
Mon Jul 26 13:54:29 PDT 2004
Hi Jobst,
I'm impressed. I didn't think you could define a coherent B>A>C>B
situation, but it looks like you did:
On Jul 26, 2004, at 1:06 PM, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
> 1. Would I prefer the situation
> (i) "A and B tied on top, A elected" or
> (ii) "A and B tied on top, B elected".
> 2. Would I prefer the situation
> (iii) "B and C tied on top, B elected" or
> (iv) "B and C tied on top, C elected".
> 3. Would I prefer the situation
> (v) "C and A tied on top, C elected" or
> (vi) "C and A tied on top, A elected".
I think the key point you make is that, in fact, the two different
'tiebreaking' votes *are* in fact taking place under different
scenarios, even if its at the same time. Rather like a runoff.
To be fair, I think such situations are relatively rare, and I
personally wouldn't want to impose that added complexity on voters for
what I consider a relatively small amount of expressive power. But, I
do think it is a valid model, and that "choice functions" could be
considered an interesting superset of "ranked ballots."
-- Ernie P.
---------------------------------
Ernest N. Prabhakar, Ph.D. <DrErnie at RadicalCentrism.org>
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