[EM] Re: completing Condorcet; MAFP and PLA

Chris Benham chrisbenham at bigpond.com
Sun Jul 4 05:13:01 PDT 2004


Kevin,
I  had written:

> "(Automated) Approval Margins":
> High-resolution ratings ballots. Inferring ranking from rating, 
> eliminate the non-members of the Schwartz-set.
> Of the remaining candidates, each ballot approves those candidates 
> rated above average (and half-approves those rated precisely average).
> Use the (inferred) rankings to determine the results of  the pairwise 
> comparisons between the remaining candidates.
> Then  measure the  "defeat strengths" by the differences in the 
> candidates' approval scores. On that basis pick the  Ranked Pairs winner. 

You asked  (Sat.Jul.3):

>Do you use Ranked Pairs for a particular reason?
>
CB: I  now find Ranked Pairs intuitive,  and  it is highly regarded. If 
 I were to change my mind, I  would probably go for a Woodall-like
"D min.." version. Only in the rare case of  the Schwartz set having 
more than three members could it give a different  result.

>I still like Condorcet completed by picking the Approval winner, where
>all ranked candidates are considered approved.  Offensive order reversal
>becomes less appealing.  In exchange you get a worse LNHarm problem, but
>only when there is no CW.
>
CB: I  like this better than the limited-slot methods.

>By the way, I think MAFP is less appealing than party list Approval now.
>In party list approval, the voter approves any number of lists and any
>number of candidates within any number of lists (approved or no), and the
>most approved candidate on the most approved list is elected.
>
CB: I'm afraid I can't take "Party List Approval" (PLA) seriously as a 
practical proposal. It seems a bit similar in concept  to a
set-intersection method like  DAC  or  DSC.

Chris  Benham




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