[EM] Re: completing Condorcet; MAFP and PLA
Chris Benham
chrisbenham at bigpond.com
Sun Jul 4 05:13:01 PDT 2004
Kevin,
I had written:
> "(Automated) Approval Margins":
> High-resolution ratings ballots. Inferring ranking from rating,
> eliminate the non-members of the Schwartz-set.
> Of the remaining candidates, each ballot approves those candidates
> rated above average (and half-approves those rated precisely average).
> Use the (inferred) rankings to determine the results of the pairwise
> comparisons between the remaining candidates.
> Then measure the "defeat strengths" by the differences in the
> candidates' approval scores. On that basis pick the Ranked Pairs winner.
You asked (Sat.Jul.3):
>Do you use Ranked Pairs for a particular reason?
>
CB: I now find Ranked Pairs intuitive, and it is highly regarded. If
I were to change my mind, I would probably go for a Woodall-like
"D min.." version. Only in the rare case of the Schwartz set having
more than three members could it give a different result.
>I still like Condorcet completed by picking the Approval winner, where
>all ranked candidates are considered approved. Offensive order reversal
>becomes less appealing. In exchange you get a worse LNHarm problem, but
>only when there is no CW.
>
CB: I like this better than the limited-slot methods.
>By the way, I think MAFP is less appealing than party list Approval now.
>In party list approval, the voter approves any number of lists and any
>number of candidates within any number of lists (approved or no), and the
>most approved candidate on the most approved list is elected.
>
CB: I'm afraid I can't take "Party List Approval" (PLA) seriously as a
practical proposal. It seems a bit similar in concept to a
set-intersection method like DAC or DSC.
Chris Benham
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