[EM] Re: completing Condorcet; MAFP and PLA

[Kevin Venzke]

Chris,

--- Chris Benham <chrisbenham at bigpond.com> a écrit : 
> > "Approval Margins":
> > High-resolution ratings ballots. Inferring ranking from rating, 
> > eliminate the non-members of the Schwartz-set.
> > Of the remaining candidates, each ballot approves those candidates 
> > rated above average (and half-approves those rated precisely average).
> > Use the (inferred) rankings to determine the results of  the pairwise 
> > comparisons between the remaining candidates.
> > Then  measure the  "defeat strengths" by the differences in the 
> > candidates' approval scores. On that basis pick the  Ranked Pairs 
> > winner. 

Do you use Ranked Pairs for a particular reason?

> So I  no longer  support Condorcet completed by Compressing Ranks, or 
>  Condorcet completed by Approval Elimination.
> I  think they are unneccessarily drastic. I scratched the  Approval 
>  Elimination method when I discovered  that it is vulnerable to
> Pushover strategy.

I still like Condorcet completed by picking the Approval winner, where
all ranked candidates are considered approved.  Offensive order reversal
becomes less appealing.  In exchange you get a worse LNHarm problem, but
only when there is no CW.


By the way, I think MAFP is less appealing than party list Approval now.
In party list approval, the voter approves any number of lists and any
number of candidates within any number of lists (approved or no), and the
most approved candidate on the most approved list is elected.

This is better than MAFP because voters outside a majority coalition can
influence which of the majority's candidates is elected.  It is also less
arbitrary, since having a majority or not is not important.  Similarly,
since the "second round" is based on the winning list and not a majority
approval figure, voters don't have to wonder which candidates will still be
in the running.

The main downside is that the majority coalition will have to decide prior
to nomination which candidates they back, and nominate them together.  In
MAFP this can be coordinated after nomination.

A second downside is that party list Approval doesn't meet weak FBC unless
you assume that a list's candidates are always clones.

Kevin Venzke
stepjak at yahoo.fr


	

	
		
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