[EM] Ossipoff's lost 8 proofs now supplied by Adam Tarr Re: [EM] Clarifying the definitions

[Craig Carey]

At 2004-01-31 15:55 -0500 Saturday, Adam Tarr wrote:
>I recognize the futility in arguing with Craig, but I'll say a few things.
...
>>Adam Tarr wrote:
>> >
>> >This is, in my opinion, the crucial difference between the (non-academic)
>> >criteria that Mike uses, and the standard academic criteria.  Normal
>> >academic criteria essentially tell you something about how a method handles
>> >a certain set of ballots.
...
>As Markus pointed out, "ballots" and "initial preference order" are 
>essentially equivalent statments in most academic criteria.


I am sure that Mr Schulze would be in the wrong; and there is not enough
text (for me) to explain the word "initial".

Are you talking about the 1st case of two cases in a comparison and using
the word "initial" to identify that case. I guess that Markus did not say
that. I only joined very recently and lack archives.


...
>>Last time I asked you a question you made a really obvious show of
>>pretending to withhold information that you claimed to have and really
>>did not have. After more than a few messages, you did not make the
>>information available.
>
>I never claimed to have the information you wanted (a FBC definition that 
>would satisfy you).  I was subjected to an unending stream of insults, however.
>

Oh, yes, you implied (said?) in public that FBC could be used.
I seem to recall that.

In private, I remember that FBC was not something you could use.
The insults should not have been there but your were withholding the
proof that you used the rule. I forgot the public claim but it was to say
that FBC was used.


>>Lying in public is a trait of devot[]ees of Mike Guru Ottisoff.
>
>1)  I'm not a liar.

That was not alleged by me in the last message.
I do not know if you are a liar.

If there was a dispute then it would be over these 2 lines by your which I
restore to this e-mail message (you edited them out):

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|                            Criteria like FBC or SFC deal with initial 
| preferences, and allow them to change when they become ballots in the method.
| 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

SFC is a wrong rule. Apparently MIKE never ever tests a rule. In theory that
would raise his ability to reject IRV and STV, and write the result up by
saying the rule is incomprehensible, too unfair, boundlessly undesirable, and
inconsistent with justice, fairness, etc..

Neither seems to talk about initial values.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|            Strategy-Free Criterion (SFC)
|
|            Definitions
|
|            A sincere vote is one with no falsified preferences or
|            preferences left unspecified when the election method allows them
|            to be specified (in addition to the preferences already
|            specified).
|
|            One candidate is preferred over another candidate if, in a one-
|            on-one competition, more voters prefer the first candidate than
|            prefer the other candidate.
|
|            If one candidate is preferred over each of the other candidates,
|            that candidate is the Ideal Democratic Winner (IDW).
|
|            Statement of Criterion
|
|            If an Ideal Democratic Winner (IDW) exists, and if a majority
|            prefers the IDW to another candidate, then the other candidate
|            should not win if that majority votes sincerely and no other
|            voter falsifies any preferences.
|
|            Complying Methods
|
|            The Condorcet method complies with the Strategy-Free Criterion,
|            but none of the other methods in the compliance table above
|            comply.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|            Favorite Betrayal Criterion (FBC)
|
|            Statement of Criterion
|
|            By voting another candidate over his favorite, a voter should
|            never get a result that he considers preferable to every result
|            he could get without doing so.
|
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

FBC is still not fixed. 

----


>2)  I'm not a devotee of any gurus.
>

That may be a mistake I made. Maybe it is nothing more than people
independently concluding that Mike has the right stuff for a voting
theory: no not dual polytopes, but instead a capacity to refuse to reply
to e-mail from the list's nobodies that harasses him over truth issues
for potentially decades. Oh before I forget, he has got the rules.

He is fast at deploying them ....

Mike has finally achieved what few had suspected: he exhaustively tested nearly all
of  he world's best preferential voting methods using one of the rules.
The SFC rule:

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>Of course IRV has rank balloting and fails SFC anyway, as most rank methods 
***** # 3 ******                               ^ [Request proof number 3]

>do. And evenmost pairwise count methods fail SFC, GSFC, WDSC, & SDSC,
  ^ [Request proof number 4]  ***** # 4 ****** 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

====> SFC is one of the rules that Mr Tarr wrote on (see above).
Also its the only rule that was used to check most STV variants and
other methods.

The description of the work done by Mike is brief enough to be
suspect. It is only 5 words after the comma. 

Note the classic pairwise comparing community trick of defining
arbitrary Real valued constants using English words and carefully
avoiding saying what the numbers are.

About 15 hours ago I asked Mr Schulze for a definition of his
Schulze method (published in October 2003) and even now I do not
have a statement of what the Floyd algorithm is actually
inserted into.

Code filling the "d" matrix is perfectly missing from the Shulze
submission to Voting Matters. I considered that a new journal
might be a nice solution. There is a problem with the editor.

MIKE OSSIPOFF ALSO was minimally open and honest about the weighting
numbers. Here is evidence that weighting numbers must exist:

|            on-one competition, more voters prefer the first candidate than
|            prefer the other candidate.

He has a preference of a group so there is some summing of paper
counts|weights. Also the numbers missing.

Mr Adam Tarr, will start proving that he did not lie when implying
he had an inderstanding of SFC, and make give us the weighting
numbers.

The 5 categories are these (And they have their own numbers):
(...X...Y...),
(...Y...X...)
(...X...)
(...Y...)
(...)

It was novel to have pairwise comparing ported into a rule, by now
the number one issue over avoiding disclosing the 5 numbers.
Holding constant and rigid the normal vector constraining polytopes
requires that the 5 Real numbers vary all over the place.

Mr Ossipoff will be solving that by devising a rule requiring that
monotonicity is absent or power is abused or negated, not dissipated,
or something like that.

Mike seems to have tested 'most' STV-paper methods using a wrong SFC
rule.

Mr Adam Tarr could have used that as grounds for not reponding to
request #3 (it asked for all the proofs).

All that Steve Eppley research using computers and random numbers
has been blown away by the new disclosure that most preferential
voting methods have been checked,and to be rough, failed or
something, by a pairwise comparing rule.



Craig Carey