[EM] Re: Cardinal Ratings vs. Approval Voting (vs. IRV)

Kevin Venzke stepjak at yahoo.fr
Sun Jan 18 15:05:02 PST 2004


 --- Bill Lewis Clark <wclark at xoom.org> a écrit : 
> >> Suppose voter preferences are as follows:
> >> A>B>C, approve AB -- 30%
> >> A>B>C, approve A  -- 21%
> >> C>B>A, approve BC -- 25%
> >> C>B>A, approve C  -- 24%
> Rob LeGrand replied:
> > But the voters who approved A and B aren't using their optimal
> > strategy. They could achieve a better result by approving only A.
> With the election being so closely split (51% to 49% in the final outcome
> for A vs. C), it would seem unwise (to say the least) for the A voters NOT
> to have approved B.  Otherwise, there was a good chance C might have won.

If that perception is correct, I agree.  So what's with the CR version
having those voters give B a half vote?  Is that supposed to do something?

Where is the scenario where rating in the middle turns out to have been
optimal after the fact?  Or have I misunderstood the claim?

Kevin Venzke
stepjak at yahoo.fr

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