[EM] Re: Cardinal Ratings vs. Approval Voting (vs. IRV)

Bill Lewis Clark wclark at xoom.org
Sun Jan 18 07:53:09 PST 2004

Bill Lewis Clark wrote:

>> Suppose voter preferences are as follows:

>> A>B>C, approve AB -- 30%
>> A>B>C, approve A  -- 21%
>> C>B>A, approve BC -- 25%
>> C>B>A, approve C  -- 24%

Rob LeGrand replied:

> But the voters who approved A and B aren't using their optimal
> strategy. They could achieve a better result by approving only A.

Yes, but you're only noticing that after the fact.  I tried to pick my
example so as to keep things as close as possible, while still addressing
the points raised on the Fairvote website (and still using nice whole

With the election being so closely split (51% to 49% in the final outcome
for A vs. C), it would seem unwise (to say the least) for the A voters NOT
to have approved B.  Otherwise, there was a good chance C might have won.

I'll address this point in more detail in my responses to other posts, but
my first impression here seems to be that there is an over-emphasis on
strategy in these analyses.  I question whether typical real-world voters
are that concerned with strategy, and particularly whether it's a viable
option in light of the uncertainty of close elections.


Dennis Kucinich for President in 2004

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