[EM] CCSCRRIRVE (maybe "Schwartz//SC-Coombs"?)

Bart Ingles bartman at netgate.net
Sat Jan 17 11:22:02 PST 2004

Kevin Venzke wrote:
> Chris,
>  --- Chris Benham <chrisbenham at bigpond.com> a écrit :
> >   I propose and reccomend this single-winner  Condorcet  compliant method:
> > Plain ranked-ballots, equal preferences and truncation ok.
> > 1: Eliminate all candidates who are not members of the Schwartz set.
> > 2: If  more than one candidate remains, then based on the symetrically
> > completed (SC) and reversed rankings,
> > eliminate the candidate picked by the Alternative Vote (aka IRV).
> > Repeat steps 1 and 2 until only one candidate (the winner) remains
> Why reverse the rankings before eliminating the IRV winner?
> Just kidding.

I think that's equivalent to Coombs, which if anything is even more
vulnerable to burying than Borda.  You might as well use Borda as the
completion method, since the Borda score can be inferred from the
pairwise matrix.


More information about the Election-Methods mailing list