[EM] CCSCRRIRVE (maybe "Schwartz//SC-Coombs"?)

Kevin Venzke stepjak at yahoo.fr
Sat Jan 17 09:51:01 PST 2004


 --- Chris Benham <chrisbenham at bigpond.com> a écrit : 
>   I propose and reccomend this single-winner  Condorcet  compliant method:
> Plain ranked-ballots, equal preferences and truncation ok.
> 1: Eliminate all candidates who are not members of the Schwartz set.
> 2: If  more than one candidate remains, then based on the symetrically 
> completed (SC) and reversed rankings,
> eliminate the candidate picked by the Alternative Vote (aka IRV).
> Repeat steps 1 and 2 until only one candidate (the winner) remains

Why reverse the rankings before eliminating the IRV winner?

Just kidding.

> Unlike  WV, this method  meets  Symetric Completion, and  I  believe 
> that that allows it to meet my
> Decisiveness Fairness Standard, which means means meeting Kevin Venzke's 
>  "Earlier-no-harm" and "Earlier-no-help"
> criteria

If Condorcet is incompatible with the LNH criteria, I have to believe it
won't mix with ENH, either...

Kevin Venzke
stepjak at yahoo.fr

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