[EM] Better Smith Majority Approval

MIKE OSSIPOFF nkklrp at hotmail.com
Thu Jan 15 00:50:01 PST 2004

(deletes for majority defeats only if they're not in a cycle of majority 

Balloting: Rank-Balloting, with Approval cutoff.

Truncation & equal-ranking allowed.

1. Drop from the rankings every candidate who isn't in the Smith set.

2. If more than 1 remains, drop from the rankings every candidate who has a 
majority defeat that isn't in a cycle of majority defeats, unless that would 
delete all the remaining candidates.

3. If more than 1 remain, apply Approval, electing the candidate above the 
most voters' Approval cutoffs.

[end of Smith Majority Approval definition]

This is for public elections. For committees, meetings, organizations and 
polls whose participants don't object to the added wordiness of the Schwartz 
set, the use of the Schwartz set instead of the Smith set would be a good 

As with any good method, the tie-drop-option could be useful if there were 
concern about offensive order-reversal. It gives the voter the option to 
mark a tie-drop-line to indicate that if there's a circular tie whose every 
member has a majority defeat in that cycle, and with some members above that 
tie-drop-line and some below it, then that voter wants to delete from his 
ranking all the candidates below his tie-drop-line.

Likewise the other anti-order-reversal enhancements that I've described 
could be useful if there were concern about offensive order-reversal.


Smith  Majority Approal, like NES, is intended to meet the standards & 
criteria that I consider important, with defensive strategy properties like 
those of wv, while minimizing other strategy incentives.

Mike Ossipoff

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