[EM] Smith Majority Approval

MIKE OSSIPOFF nkklrp at hotmail.com
Wed Jan 14 22:56:04 PST 2004

Balloting: Rank-balloting with Approval cutoff. Truncation & equal ranking 
(though they're unlikely to be needed)

1. Delete from the rankings every candidate who isn't in the Smith set.

2. If more than 1 remain, delete from the rankings every candidate who has a 
majority defeat,
    unless all remaining do.

3. If more than 1 remain, apply Approval, electing the candidate above the 
most people's Approval

[end of Smith Majority Approval defilnition]

As with any of the best methods, this method could have the tie-drop-line 
option, by which the voter could indicate that, if there's a circular tie 
whose every member has a majority defeat, and which has members above & 
below that voter's tie-drop-line, that voter wants to delete from his 
ranking every candidate below that line. That option is no more needed with 
this method than with wv, NES, or DSV, but could be useful with any good 
method if order-reversal were regarded as a problem.

Likewise, the other anti-order-reverrsal enhancements that I've described 
could be useful with any good method, including this one, if order-reversal 
were considered a problem.

The above definition is for public elections. For committees, organizations, 
meetings, and polls, using the Schwartz set instead of the Smith set would 
be a refinement, provided that the participants accept its slightly wordier 

Mike Ossipoff

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