CR == Approval? Re: [EM] Re: Election-methods digest, Vol 1 #517 - 3 msgs
Ernest Prabhakar
drernie at mac.com
Wed Feb 25 23:00:02 PST 2004
Hi all,
On Feb 25, 2004, at 9:36 PM, Ken Johnson wrote:
>> CR is strategically equiovalent to Approval: In CR, you maximize your
>> expectation by giving maximum points to those candidates for whom
>> you'd vote in Approval, and giving minimum points to the rest.
This statement has always puzzled me. I think the more precise
statement is that the *optimal* strategy in CR is equivalent to the
optimal strategy in Approval. Technically, I believe an optimal
strategy is one where there is no better defense than the same
strategy. Put another way, the most robust strategy for maximizing
utility of outcomes is equivalent between CR and Approval.
However, it seems like there can well be extreme cases, due to either
detailed information or sub-optimal strategic behavior by opponents,
where a different strategy would actually be more -effective- (optimal
doesn't mean perfect). Thus, in those cases, the most effective
strategy for CR would not be precisely identical to Approval, simply
because the scenarios are slightly different.
Anyway, I think the statement "the optimal strategy for CR is the same
as that for Approval" is both more technically precise, and less
confusing, than the oft-repeated "CR is strategically equivalent to
Approval" meme that gets kicked around here periodically, so I would
like to recommend its adoption.
-- Ernie P.
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