[EM] electoral methods - US and Europe

[Toplak Jurij]

Hi,

No, US does not use Saint Lague (Webster) any more. First Hamilton (Hare)
was passed by Congress and vetoed (it was the first presidential veto ever).
Then Jefferson (D'Hondt) method was used from 1791 to 1830s. Then Webster
(Saint-Lague) was used only once (1842) and then in 1850 Hamilton method
(Hare) was used till 1910. Because of the paradoxes it produces it was never
strictly observed. Then, Webster was adopted again (1911). Then, in 1930
Hill method was used and it is still used. This method is used nowhere else
in the world, as far as I know.
During this time at least 10 other methods were considered, among them
Adams, Dean, Lowdnes, several Willcox methods, etc.

The whole history is described in Balinski & Young. Fair Representation:
Meeting the Ideal of One Man, One Vote (2nd. ed) 2001. Authors describe all
the methods used and claim that Webster (Saint-Lague) should be used instead
of Hill method. If you are interested in other methods that were considered
but not adopted, they are in Chaffee. Congressional Reapportionment. Harvard
Law Review (1928) p. 1015. But they are of no use, because most of them
produce "Alabama paradox" or other paradoxes.

And yes, I am aware of the "theoretical unsoundnesses" of these methods and
paradoxes they produce and I never suggested them. I said, though, that
D'Hondt favors large parties and Webster does not. My point was, however, to
stress how European research was always 70-90 years behind the American one.

Best,
Jurij

> I reply:
> Do you realize the extent of the theoretical unsoundness of Saint-Lague
> and Hare? I was convinced of it by an example which James Gilmour gave
> last July. Here is a link to the posting which contains that example:
>
http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2003-J
uly/010368.html
> I would say that Saint-Lague systematically favors smaller parties, and
> while I'm all for smaller parties, I don't think that this is a good way
> to go about giving them a bigger role, because it introduces a paradox of
> more people gaining fewer representatives, along with an incentive for
> parties to split themselves up into smaller chunks for purely strategic
> reasons. I've read Lijphart and I think he was wrong about this.
> I think that the best way to help smaller parties in a proportional
> representation scenario is to use an STV system so that there is no risk
> of people "wasting" their votes on small parties with not quite enough
> votes. Also in some cases the votes transferred from an eliminated small
> party candidate may go towards helping another small party candidate to
> win a seat.
> As for seat apportionment by state, I admit again that I'm not an expert
> in it. You're saying that the U.S. now uses a Saint-Lague divisor? I live
> in the U.S., and I didn't even know that.
> >
> James
>
>