[EM] "Sincere preferences" considered superfluous
Richard Moore
moore3t1 at cox.net
Thu Feb 12 01:38:01 PST 2004
Any of the strategic criteria on the electionmethods.org site can be
defined without reference to "sincere preferences" or "favorites".
Here are my "votes-only" definitions:
SFC: If X beats all other candidates in pairwise comparisons, and
a majority of ballots rank X over Y, then Y does not win.
GSFC: If X is in the Smith set and Y is not, and a majority of ballots
rank X over Y, then Y does not win.
SDSC: For any combination of N ballots that all rank candidate X over
candidate Y, and any other combination of M ballots, if N is greater
than M, then Y does not win the election when the two groups of
ballots are combined.
Note: The statement in the electionmethods.org commentary that
"Compliance with SDSC means that a majority never needs any more than
truncation strategy to defeat a particular candidate" is puzzling
(truncation strategy is "falsely voting two candidates equal", is it
not?). Also, the statements in the commentary about "countering
offensive order reversal" are completely irrelevant, since the need
for defensive strategy is based on the opposing votes cast regardless
of whether those votes are the result of offensive order reversal.
WDSC: For any combination of N ballots that all rank candidate X equal
to or higher than candidate Y, and any other combination of M ballots,
if N is greater than M, then Y does not win the election when the two
groups of ballots are combined.
FBC: For some set S of ballots, if R is the set of results that can
occur when ballot B is added to S if candidate X is given the highest
ranking on B, and R' is the set of results that can occur if ballot B
is added to S when candidate X is not given the highest ranking on B,
then either X is a member of R, or R' is a subset of R.
-- Richard
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