[EM] Re: group strategy equilibria: no sincere CW
seppley at alumni.caltech.edu
Wed Aug 25 00:09:34 PDT 2004
Anthony Duff asked:
> I am interested in the question of the frequency
> of non-existence of a sincere CW. I personally
> do not know that it is probable.
Here's another reason to occasionally expect
sincere cycles at the top, when we're electing
candidates to offices: Candidates want to win!
In other words, they'll position themselves on
the issues in such a way as to give themselves
a good shot at winning. Assuming a Condorcetian
voting method, there figures to be a bunch of
candidates competing to be the most popular
centrist compromise, adopting positions similar
to each other. I think this implies simulations
using random electorates provide a reasonable
estimate of the frequency of sincere cycles
at the top.
Peter Ordeshook's book, Game Theory and Political
Theory, has a table on p.58 listing such estimates.
Here are its percentages assuming a large number
#alternatives noCW fraction
(Interpret the #alternatives column as the number
of alternatives competing to be the centrist
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