[EM] Re: group strategy equilibria: no sincere CW
Bart Ingles
bartman at netgate.net
Tue Aug 24 23:31:25 PDT 2004
Anthony Duff wrote:
>
> I am interested in the question of the frequency of non-existance of
> a sincere CW. I personally do not know that it is probable.
In Merrill, "Making Multicandidate...", in the table on p.24, he shows
frequency of sincere CW for 5 candidates under a random society
simulation, and for some spatial models using either 2 or 4 dimensions.
The spatial models had a CW around 98 or 99 percent of the time, and
with the 5-candidate random society model there was a CW 76% of the
time.
Merrill apparently believes that a realistic scenario would fall
somewhere between the random society and spatial models.
> I have been under the impression, that it is actually improbable, and
> that when it would occur, the cycle of defeats would probably be
> quite weak. Further, it is my impression that the root of strategy
> problem of condorcet is that while a sincere CW may exist, a losing
> faction can, with straightforward strategy, vote strategically to
> defeat the sincere CW.
That might be the greater concern-- would cycle-creation be an important
strategy? If so, then actual frequency of cycles could swamp the
sincere figures.
Bart
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