[EM] Re: group strategy equilibria: no sincere CW

Anthony Duff anthony_duff at yahoo.com.au
Tue Aug 24 18:14:14 PDT 2004

Jobst wrote in part...

> ... as there is no
> sincere CW (which is quite probable as we know!). This is because
> whatever candidate A gets elected, there is always a majority
> prefering some B who can elect B by voting "B > all others" without
> there being any counter-strategy to this threat.

I am interested in the question of the frequency of non-existance of
a sincere CW.  I personally do not know that it is probable.  

I have been under the impression, that it is actually improbable, and
that when it would occur, the cycle of defeats would probably be
quite weak.  Further, it is my impression that the root of strategy
problem of condorcet is that while a sincere CW may exist, a losing
faction can, with straightforward strategy, vote strategically to
defeat the sincere CW.   

I would be very interested to read of evidence or reasoning for why
it might be expected that a sincere condorcet winner will not exist
with some reasonable probability.

Jobst's reasoning above "It is because..." is not a reason at all,
rather it is simply a statement of what it means for there not to be
a sincere CW.


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