[EM] Using weights to compensate multiple votes (Any feedback ? please !??)
seppley at alumni.caltech.edu
Tue Aug 24 18:02:15 PDT 2004
Warren Schudy wrote:
> As I understand it, your scheme, unlike regular approval,
> fails the Favorite Betrayal Criterion (FBC).
And fails clone independence. A huge spoiler problem.
It would maintain the "two-party, one nominee per party"
I'm not sure why Philippe thinks it's a problem if each
voter can select more than one candidate. What criterion
does that violate, and how is that criterion justified?
> BTW, I just noticed that (regular) approval is equivalent to
> Condorcet methods with the stipulation that all voters must
> consider all candidates to be in one of two equivalent sets
> (aka dichotomous). This is very similar to a statement in
> the book "Approval Voting", by Braham or something.
Steven Brams, I presume. But it's such an unimportant
property, since it's laughably unrealistic to assume
voters' sincere preferences are dichotomous when there
are more than two candidates. It's a product of the
"publish or perish" syndrome, most likely. Why not
go a little further and assume the voters' sincere
preferences are such that they are unanimously agreed
there's one particular candidate that should be selected?
That would be only slightly more implausible.
More information about the Election-Methods