[EM] Using weights to compensate multiple votes (Any feedback ? please !??)

[Steve Eppley]

Warren Schudy wrote:
> As I understand it, your scheme, unlike regular approval, 
> fails the Favorite Betrayal Criterion (FBC). 
-snip-

And fails clone independence.  A huge spoiler problem.
It would maintain the "two-party, one nominee per party" 
system.

I'm not sure why Philippe thinks it's a problem if each
voter can select more than one candidate.  What criterion
does that violate, and how is that criterion justified?

> BTW, I just noticed that (regular) approval is equivalent to
> Condorcet methods with the stipulation that all voters must
> consider all candidates to be in one of two equivalent sets 
> (aka dichotomous). This is very similar to a statement in
> the book "Approval Voting", by Braham or something. 

Steven Brams, I presume.  But it's such an unimportant 
property, since it's laughably unrealistic to assume 
voters' sincere preferences are dichotomous when there 
are more than two candidates.  It's a product of the 
"publish or perish" syndrome, most likely.  Why not 
go a little further and assume the voters' sincere 
preferences are such that they are unanimously agreed 
there's one particular candidate that should be selected?  
That would be only slightly more implausible.

--Steve