[EM] group strategy equilibria

James Green-Armytage jarmyta at antioch-college.edu
Mon Aug 23 17:55:35 PDT 2004

Steve, you wrote:
>There are other interesting refinements of the notion of 
>equilibrium.  For instance, a strategy available to a 
>player may be "dominated" by another strategy, in the 
>sense that the other strategy will always work at least
>as well for him and sometimes will work better.  A 
>"rational" player will never choose a dominated strategy, 
>so it's common to neglect all equilibria that incorporate 
>dominated strategies.  

	Yes, that is interesting. In plurality, for example, voting for your last
choice is a dominated strategy. In approval, approving your last choice is
a dominated strategy. I don't know exactly how this affects my analysis...
for the sake of making a tidy argument I'd rather ignore it, but for the
sake of academic interest it would be interesting to see where it leads.

>And Myerson-Weber equilibria have 
>been written about many times in this maillist.

	Correct me if I'm wrong... These have to do with the probability that a
given vote will have such-and-such an effect, times the marginal utility
of that effect... Am I even close??

my best,

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