jarmyta at antioch-college.edu
Mon Aug 23 16:36:30 PDT 2004
seppley at alumni.caltech.edu writes:
>Mike's definition here is incorrect. He gave the
>definition for a "group strategy equilibrium."
>Those equilibria are rarer than Nash equilibria,
>which merely require that no _individual_ voter
>can get an outcome she prefers more by changing
>her vote (holding all the other votes constant).
That makes sense. I didn't really think it was the right definition for
Nash equilibria. That's why I put "Nash" in quotes in my last posting. So,
the "group strategy equilibrium" is what we're talking about. That's fine.
I think that group strategy equilibria are useful to talk about, probably
more useful than the Nash equilibria... since nearly all Votes in a large
electorate qualify as Nash equilibria, as you defined it above. Let's keep
talking about group strategy equilibria.
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