[EM] A "Runoff" type method for resolution of cycles incondorcet

[Dave Ketchum]

Reason I choke on this thread is that this idea inflicts strategy on 
Condorcet I have to warn my voters that ranking even a minor candidate in 
front of me can get me discarded.

Condorcet should stay with voters ranking purely by desires.

Dave

On Tue, 27 Apr 2004 22:55:21 -0400 Ken Taylor wrote:

> 
>>At 10:30 AM -0400 4/27/04, Ken Taylor wrote:
>>
>>> > At 10:21 AM -0400 4/27/04, Ken Taylor wrote:
>>>
>>>> >I'm dropping the weakest candidate, as defined by number of first
>>>> >choice votes, which causes all their defeats of other candidates
>>>> >to be dropped.
>>>>
>>>> What will you do when two or more candidates are tied for least first
>>>> choice votes?
>>>>
>>>>
>>>I'm not sure. There are probably several different ways to deal with
>>>
> this,
> 
>>>and I don't think it's very relevant to evaluating the procedure in
>>>
> general.
> 
>>If you were to drop all candidates tied for least first choice votes,
>>it seems possible that your method could not claim to be cloneproof.
>>Two or more clones could evenly split the vote and then all be
>>eliminated even if they, in combination, had > 50% of the vote,
>>implying that one of the clones should win.
>>
>>
> 
> Ahhh this is a good point. I may have underestimated the impact that a
> tie-resolution strategy could have. Though, the larger the election, the
> less likely that such a tie could occur.
> 
> I'm still curious as to my original question -- has this overall method been
> proposed before, and what possible weakness does it have (assuming that the
> tie-for-last-place problem can be solved)?
> 
> Ken

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  Dave Ketchum   108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY  13827-1708   607-687-5026
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