[EM] electoral college/ two-party-duopoly

[Curt Siffert]

On Apr 27, 2004, at 4:55 PM, Adam H Tarr wrote:

> Curt wrote:
>
>> [ The first issue really illustrates what I find so impossible about
>> IRV advocates, because many of them advocate IRV *in presidential
>> elections*, but *before* removing the EC.  Implementing IRV in pres.
>> elections on a state level, without changing the EC, has *no* effect
>> whatsoever,
>
> Not so.  It could swing an election from one major party to another in 
> a
> swing state, by transferring the votes of a wing party.  To take 2000 
> as
> an easy example: give Gore the Nader votes, and he as a clear majority 
> in
> Florida.

I should have been more clear - Such an IRV scheme has no effect on
making it more likely their candidate will win or that their interests 
will
be reflected.  They can't win the EC until they have 270 EVs, at which
point they're not exactly a third party anymore.

> There is an argument that IRV perpetuates a two-party system almost as
> well as plurality does.  That's a bad thing in general, but in the
> isolated case of trying to avoid elections being sent to the House, 
> it's a
> good thing.

What pro-IRV argument makes sent-to-House elections less likely?

> 1) Some small states actually get under-represented in the EC, due to
> being just short of getting an extra representative.  So the EC is
> actually pretty erratic in this regard.

Yes, apportionment is sort of arbitrary.  The ratio of representatives 
to
senators is arbitrary - the House scaled with population for a while, 
then
just turned the scaling off.

> 3) People tend to associate small states with rural populations and
> certain interests, but the EC is a very crude tool at best if 
> increasing
> the representation of those interests.  And why should they get a 
> larger
> say, anyway?

There are strong arguments on both sides of this question.  I actually
think less populated states should get a higher representation ratio
for environmental reasons.  But yes, the EC's current implementation
of this aim is crude and bad.

If I were to overhaul it and still keep the EC, I'd award each state's 
EVs
proportionally according to the placement of each candidate in that
state.  According to that scheme, by the way, Bush just barely won in
2000 (spoiled by Nader) - Gore actually won more of the ultra-close
states in 2000.  I'd figure the placement of each candidate with a 
better
voting scheme.  (Thus my question about normalizing placement of
multiple candidates on a 100-point scale a few threads ago.)  I'd
re-apportion the EVs to more accurately reflect the population.  I'd 
want
some way to come up with a more thoughtful compromise/ratio between
popular and regional representation (less arbitrary than 435:100).

> So, the EC should be abolished, but that's not news around here.

On the contrary, there are many Condorcet advocates that might not
support the abolishment of the EC under all circumstances.  I think it's
superior to a nationwide popular (plurality) vote, for instance.

>>  Sure, perhaps too stable, but I personally do find it a
>> hard argument to make that a multiple-party legislative body is 
>> clearly
>> and incontrovertibly better than a two-party legislative body.  When I
>> see the nature of some of the power-sharing alliance agreements in 
>> some
>> parliamentary bodies with many small parties, it doesn't seem to do a
>> much better job of democratically representing the population than a
>> two-party body (this reaches the outer limits of my study and I don't
>> have many examples to draw on; the only one I find myself thinking of
>> in this regard is Israel's).
>
> The unstable parliamentary democracies are the ones where the ruling
> coalition needs to maintain a majority so that it can form a 
> government.
> Even if we had 50 parties in the house, there would still be no need 
> for
> this.  Sure, they'd have to think of new rules for forming committees 
> and
> such, but the executive branch is elected seperately in the USA, so all
> those stability issues are not a problem.

That is a good point, I will remember this one.  Our leader doesn't by 
definition
come from our ruling congressional party.

> ...if you put more diverse opinions on the floor, that are more
> representative of the people, then you give the people more choices 
> about
> how the government is run.  Right now, (to pick an example out of a 
> hat)
> voters can't easily elect a representative to congress who will oppose
> affirmative action but support abortion rights.  If I have those 
> opinions,
> I'm probably going to end up voting for a candidate who will 
> misrepresent
> me on one of them.  More parties would solve many such connundrums.

I agree, but the point against such an arrangement is that it could spur
even greater gridlock within the legislative body.

>> In short, is it not possible to simply reform the two-party duopoly
>> rather than get rid of it entirely?
>
> I really don't think so... as long as you have two parties, you
> essentially force the voters to tie their decisions on every issue
> together and cast one vote, even if they disagree with 49% of those
> decisions.

However, in a representative democracy, this is kind of the point.
Part of my input has already been accounted for in earlier elections -
primaries and the like.  And so, my representative in DC isn't really
expected to represent *me*, he's expected to represent the consensus
of which I am a part.  I expect to not fit that mold exactly.

Whereas in a legislative body of hundreds of representatives, one of
whom might represent me exactly, they'd all be very different from each
other, and I wouldn't expect any of the body's results to be everything
that my representative wants.

So I don't see how it's clearly better.  I see Condorcet as inarguably 
better
than Plurality and IRV, but I don't see multi-party representation as 
inarguably
better than a two-party "duopoly".

- Curt