[EM] Is strategic voting a bad thing, really?

[Sampo Syreeni]

On 2004-04-05, Bart Ingles uttered:

>In general, it's a good thing. However the NEED or INCENTIVE for
>strategic voting is sometimes a bad thing, if it results in Duvergerian
>equalibria (Plurality, Runoff, Instant Runoff), or in artificial ties
>or "random" outcomes (Borda).

Quite. But I would also stress the fact that no voting system will solve
all of our problems. Democracy isn't a solvable problem, though it is an
interesting one. From my own libertarian background, it seems necessary
to delimit democracy to problems where one voting system or another can
serve us, instead of against us.

The point is, most (sensible, speaking from a social choice/math
standpoint) voting systems probably have their area of application. But
more often than not the debate over specific voting systems starts with
problems that are caused by a malapplication of democracy. Algorithms
which include a component of geographical representation serve as a
particularly salient example, since they aim at solving a problem which
results from a geographically overbroad application of democracy.

Such concerns lie squarely in the arena of public choice economics, so
they probably fall off the subject area of this list. They have to do
with the wider institutional implications of democracy, in its many
forms. But still, they probably limit what people should discuss on this
list.

As we well know, all democratic decision-making processes have certain
flaws. We should perfect them, but they will still have certain flaws.
That is why we should also probably limit the discussion on-list to
subjects that have nothing to do with the wider implications of voting
systems. Needs and incentives in the wider political sphere are just two
examples.

As I see it, there are three levels of looking at voting systems. The
first is the pure social choice stance represented by e.g. Arrow's
theorem. The second consists, in addition, of tactical analysis. The
third then covers the total societal consequences of democracy and our
chosen voting system.

I think needs, and incentives, and the need thereof lie in the third
sphere. I don't think they're actually relevant to this list. I
obviously need to discuss what the needs and lack of them would cause
(in the second sphere) but any normative statements regarding them seem
to me to be outside the scope.
-- 
Sampo Syreeni, aka decoy - mailto:decoy at iki.fi, tel:+358-50-5756111
student/math+cs/helsinki university, http://www.iki.fi/~decoy/front
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