[EM] March 29 Newsweek article on verifiable voting

[Dave Ketchum]

I do this last pass to warn others - Adam seems not to hear me.

PROVIDED the programs that did the pretty printing were designed, 
honorably, for that purpose, they might be useful.

HOWEVER, I ask for and do not hear of verification that the programs are such.

LEAVING a concern that a program could be written and used which appeared 
to conform, but destroyed secrecy and, perhaps, found a way to falsify 
ballot counts.

Dave Ketchum

On Mon, 05 Apr 2004 01:12:03 -0500Adam Tarr wrote:

> Dave Ketchum wrote:
> 
>> >> How about leaning on IMPORTANT topics:
>> >>
>> >> How well do these schemes attend to voter secrecy?
>> >>      Without secrecy, voters can sell "voting right" to those willing
>> >> to pay for such.
>> >>      Without assurance that secrecy is being maintained, voters can
>> >> PROPERLY fear that, if they dare to vote "wrong", this may be known
>> >> and result in punishment.
>> >>
>> >> Voters NEED the right to inspect those boxes labeled "voting machines"
>> >> to verify whether they properly let the voters indicate their desires
>> >> and report proper counts at end of election.
>> >
>> >
>> > This dichotomy is directly addressed by David Chaum in "Secret-Ballot
>> > Receipts:
>> > True Voter-Verifiable Elections"
>> > (http://www.voterverifiable.com/article.pdf).  The Article is very
>> > accessible and the idea is very well thought out; I recommend everybody
>> > who is concerned with these issues take a look at it.
>> >
>> Seems to be a DISCONNECT.
>>
>> You seem to believe his pretty printing makes it unnecessary to do the 
>> validation I ask for so:
> 
> 
> Not at all...
> 
>>      1.  NOTHING about my topic in the article.
> 
> 
> The receipt you get is for all intents secret, since it cannot be 
> verified by anyone else.
> 
> The voter can verify that their vote was counted.
> 
> This seemed, to me, to address the issues you were concerned with...
> 
>>      2.  NOTHING to make me believe the inspection I ask for is not 
>> needed!
> 
> 
> Indeed, nothing at all.  It just does it a different way than you are 
> implying.
> 
> I remember hearing on this list about another scheme that had been 
> developed along the lines of the link I provided, but without the 
> annoyance of the multi-layered ballot.  Sort of reducing this idea down 
> to the principles of encryption that underlie it.
> 
> The Sequoia system of a sealed paper receipt, behind glass, is a good 
> one as well.

-- 
  davek at clarityconnect.com    people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
  Dave Ketchum   108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY  13827-1708   607-687-5026
            Do to no one what you would not want done to you.
                  If you want peace, work for justice.