[EM] Which method isn't "vulnerable to compromise"?

[MIKE OSSIPOFF]

Markus said:

>Dear John B. Hodges,
>
>the following example demonstrates that Bucklin is
>vulnerable to "compromising" (i.e. insincerely ranking
>a candidate higher to make him win).

Markus, what method isn't "vulnerable to compromise"? Not BeatpathWinner (wv 
or margins). Not Plurality, IRV, Borda.

In your example below, the compromise takes victory from B and gives it to 
A. But 2/3 of the voters rank A over B. All the Condorcet versions choose A 
in that example.

So then, what you're saying is that Bucklin is "vulnerable" to protection of 
majority rule.

Vulnerable to protection of majority rule by upranking a compromise, but 
also, instead, more easily, by defensive truncation. So you'd probably also 
say that Bucklin is "vulnerable to truncation".

In the same way that Plurality is vulnerable to compromise. Some would say 
that's an odd way to describe strategy. "Vulnerable" impliess that the 
method allows something that it shouldn't allow. We often hear that methods 
are vulnerable to manipulation. When Nader-preferrers vote instead for the 
Democrat in Plurality,  is that a manipulation that they shouldn't get away 
with? Manipulating the Plurality election in order to elect Dem over Repub, 
when a majority prefer Dem to Repub?

I'm not advocating that compromise in Plurality, but if a majority want to 
enforce majority rule, that isn't an undesirable manipulation. The method's 
strategy problem is to be judged by what that majority has to do in order to 
enfocre majority rule, or to protect a CW.

Of course, where Plurality, and often IRV, need favorite-burial to protect 
majority rule or the CW, Bucklin can always accomplish that with mere 
defensive truncation.

Where, you might ask, did Markus & Blake Cretney get their head-up-the-ass 
approach to "compromise" strategy, and
their notion of strategy as a manipulation that methods shouldn't be 
vulnerable to, rather than as a regrettable need for the voter?

They copied it off their academic authors, people entirely out of touch with 
voters' concerns and interest.

Mike Ossipoff


>
>Example:
>
>   4   A > B > C
>   3   B > C > A
>   2   C > A > B
>
>   The unique Bucklin winner is candidate B.
>   However, if the 2 CAB voters had insincerely voted
>   ACB then the unique Bucklin winner would have been
>   candidate A. Since these 2 CAB voters strictly prefer
>   candidate A to candidate B, voting ACB instead of CAB
>   to change the winner from candidate B to candidate A
>   is a useful strategy for them.
>
>
>Markus Schulze
>

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