[EM] March 29 Newsweek article on verifiable voting
Dave Ketchum
davek at clarityconnect.com
Mon Apr 5 19:50:06 PDT 2004
I do this last pass to warn others - Adam seems not to hear me.
PROVIDED the programs that did the pretty printing were designed,
honorably, for that purpose, they might be useful.
HOWEVER, I ask for and do not hear of verification that the programs are such.
LEAVING a concern that a program could be written and used which appeared
to conform, but destroyed secrecy and, perhaps, found a way to falsify
ballot counts.
Dave Ketchum
On Mon, 05 Apr 2004 01:12:03 -0500Adam Tarr wrote:
> Dave Ketchum wrote:
>
>> >> How about leaning on IMPORTANT topics:
>> >>
>> >> How well do these schemes attend to voter secrecy?
>> >> Without secrecy, voters can sell "voting right" to those willing
>> >> to pay for such.
>> >> Without assurance that secrecy is being maintained, voters can
>> >> PROPERLY fear that, if they dare to vote "wrong", this may be known
>> >> and result in punishment.
>> >>
>> >> Voters NEED the right to inspect those boxes labeled "voting machines"
>> >> to verify whether they properly let the voters indicate their desires
>> >> and report proper counts at end of election.
>> >
>> >
>> > This dichotomy is directly addressed by David Chaum in "Secret-Ballot
>> > Receipts:
>> > True Voter-Verifiable Elections"
>> > (http://www.voterverifiable.com/article.pdf). The Article is very
>> > accessible and the idea is very well thought out; I recommend everybody
>> > who is concerned with these issues take a look at it.
>> >
>> Seems to be a DISCONNECT.
>>
>> You seem to believe his pretty printing makes it unnecessary to do the
>> validation I ask for so:
>
>
> Not at all...
>
>> 1. NOTHING about my topic in the article.
>
>
> The receipt you get is for all intents secret, since it cannot be
> verified by anyone else.
>
> The voter can verify that their vote was counted.
>
> This seemed, to me, to address the issues you were concerned with...
>
>> 2. NOTHING to make me believe the inspection I ask for is not
>> needed!
>
>
> Indeed, nothing at all. It just does it a different way than you are
> implying.
>
> I remember hearing on this list about another scheme that had been
> developed along the lines of the link I provided, but without the
> annoyance of the multi-layered ballot. Sort of reducing this idea down
> to the principles of encryption that underlie it.
>
> The Sequoia system of a sealed paper receipt, behind glass, is a good
> one as well.
--
davek at clarityconnect.com people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026
Do to no one what you would not want done to you.
If you want peace, work for justice.
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