[EM] Draft of CVD analysis about IRV vs. Condorcet Voting

[Stephane Rouillon]

Ken Taylor a écrit :

> And finally, as IRV is immune to this particular strategy (a claim made both
> by you and by the author of the article I was responding to), using IRV as a
> completion method would also be immune to this particular strategy. And so,
> my argument against the contention that Condorcet falls prey to this
> particular strategy is not ultimately wrong.

Could someone explain...
I have a hard time thinking IRV is immune to burying.
Yes, if any candidates wins at the first round a voter who dislikes that
candidate can't do anything about it. It's impossible to depreciate the number
of votes the winner had at first round, but this winner was a Condorcet winner
so it would be the same with Ranked Pairs (winning votes).
Now, if an IRV winner only leads at first round (or even not) and finally wins
at a later round, then the order of elimination of candidates can affect the
outcome
of the election. And in that case, unsincere ranking that reverse some
preferences,
what I call burying, can with IRV as with a Condorcet method steal the result
from
the sincere winner.

I think it should be more probable to change the outcome with IRV than with
a Condorcet method because IRV is more "all or nothing" while transfering votes
for the next round. I may be wrong, but at least I can't believe IRV is immune
to burying.

Steph