[EM] Draft of CVD analysis about IRV vs. Condorcet Voting

[Ernest Prabhakar]

Hi Ralph,

I think its a fair critique, but I would encourage you to approach them 
in a more positive fashion.  For example, I think they do raise a 
number of valid points, and this seems the first most of us have seen 
of IRV supporters actually trying to tackle the issues head on.

I would encourage you to start with affirming their valid points before 
criticizing the (notable) weaknesses, as I think it will make it more 
likely for them to acknowledge your complaints.  After all, you're 
trying to write *to* them, not *about* them, so it pays to be civil.

-- Ernie P.

On Apr 3, 2004, at 1:27 AM, James Green-Armytage wrote:

>
> to Ralph Suter,
>
> 	I liked this letter a lot. I especially liked the part where you took
> issue with Amy's treatment of Condorcet! I read that book too, and the
> part on Condorcet which you cited really bothered me. And the Lijphart
> quote, wow! I also agree that the 'punishing candidates who take clear
> stances on issues' part of the draft, which was the central argument, 
> is
> poorly supported. I also agree that IRV retains many of the polarizing
> tendencies of plurality, and this is bad news.
>
> my best,
> James
>
> RLSuter at aol.com writes:
>> I'm posting this to the Election Methods list and BCC'ing it to Rob
>> Richie
>> and Terry Bouricus of CVD. I hope they will take a look at the other
>> commentaries about the CVD draft on the EM list
>> (http://groups.yahoo.com/group/election-methods-list/) that are 
>> likely to
>> be posted in the next few days.
>>
>> In a message dated 4/2/04 3:02:14 PM Central Standard Time,
>> election-methods-list at yahoogroups.com writes:
>>
>> <<  Just became aware of this:
>>
>> Draft of CVD analysis about IRV vs. Condorcet Voting
>> http://groups.yahoo.com/group/instantrunoff/message/1548
>> (The message archives are open to everyone) >>
>>
>>
>> My response to the draft:
>>
>> This subject needs honest, well-informed, fair-minded arguments, not
>> legal
>> brief-type arguments that misrepresent opponents and overstate the
>> positives of
>> one's own opinions. The CVD draft, unfortunately, is more like a legal
>> brief.
>>
>> The first misrepresentation is the draft's description of Condorcet
>> voting as
>> "a ranked-choice system favored by some mathematicians." The truth is
>> that
>> Condorcet voting is favored not only by "some mathematicians" but by a
>> large
>> number of very well-informed and sophisticated political scientists 
>> and
>> economists and if anything has gained increased favor among voting
>> experts in recent
>> years. A much better description is the following one in the 
>> Encyclopedia
>> of
>> Democracy (1995) by Arend Lijphart, a former president of the American
>> Political
>> Science Association and, ironically, a member of CVD's advisory board:
>>
>>  There is such strong and widespread agreement among
>>  experts that the Condorcet method is the most accurate
>>  and fairest majoritarian formula that it has become the
>>  yardstick against which other formulas are measured.
>>
>> The draft's misrepresentation of Condorcet is similar to a
>> misrepresentation
>> made by one of CVD's chief theoreticians, Douglas Amy, in his book
>> "Behind the
>> Ballot Box" (2000). In his brief description of Condorcet voting (p.
>> 187),
>> Amy states:
>>
>>  There is a long history of scientists and mathematicians
>>  who dabbled in election theory and invented voting systems.
>>  They include Jean-Charles de Borda, the Marquis de
>>  Condorcet, and C. L. Dodgson -- better known as Lewis
>>  Carroll, the author of "Alice's Adventures in Wonderland."
>>
>> Amy thus begins his analysis of Condorcet voting by describing its
>> author,
>> who took his politics so seriously that he lost his life in the French
>> revolution (and was one of the earliest advocates of gender equality) 
>> and
>> whose
>> influence among modern day political scientists is far greater than 
>> Amy's
>> ever has
>> been or ever will be, as a "dabbler."
>>
>> Other people on this list are much more qualified to comment on the 
>> rest
>> of
>> the draft than I am, but what bothers me most about it is it's 
>> emphasis
>> on the
>> possibility that mediocre candidates who refuse to express strong 
>> views
>> will
>> have an advantage over other candidates and that Condorcet "punishes
>> candidates
>> who take clear stands on controversial issues and rewards candidates 
>> who
>> say
>> little of substance." This is a major theme of the overall draft, and 
>> in
>> my
>> view it is extremely theoretical and debatable and probably quite
>> mistaken.
>>
>> Also, the draft neglects to mention perhaps the single greatest 
>> failing
>> of
>> IRV, that it undervalues and fails to adequately take into account the
>> information provided by voters in their 2nd choice, 3rd choice, etc.
>> rankings. As a
>> result, it can easily enable a popular but very divisive candidate in 
>> a
>> bitterly
>> divided electorate (as the U.S. electorate arguably is today, for
>> example) to
>> defeat a strong compromise candidate who is the second choice of a 
>> large
>> majority of the electorate but the first choice of fewer people than
>> favor two of
>> the most divisive candidates. Thus, Condorcet voting is arguably more
>> likely to
>> elect candidates that will reduce a society's divisiveness, while IRV 
>> is
>> more
>> likely to elect candidates that will sustain or even increase a 
>> society's
>> divisiveness.
>>
>> -Ralph Suter
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