[EM] Condorcet subject to burying

Bart Ingles bartman at netgate.net
Sat Apr 3 06:56:01 PST 2004

IMO a Condorcet winner weak enough to have the election stolen through
strategy probably deserves to lose the election.  Regardless of the
cycle breaking method, a weak CW is subject to prisoner's dilemma, and
to what could be called "apathetic truncation."  Neither should be
considered a real-world problem, since they merely move the result in
the direction of approval voting.


Stephane Rouillon wrote:
> I just wanted to point out that I support
> James (Armitage) analysis that any cycle breaking method applied to a
> Condorcet method makes it subject to the unsincere ranking strategy
> called
> burying (not "digging" as I previously said) independently of the
> criteria used
> (winning votes, margins or relative margins).
> How serious is the problem, which choice minimize this?
> I think any weak Condorcet winner can be stolen with the appropriate
> strategy,
> winning votes seems able to protect a strong Condorcet winner (which has
> a more than 50% victory against any opponent) and margins and relative
> margins can protect a stronger Condorcet winner (which has a more than
> two third victory against any opponent). Now, does How does that
> protection evolve for weak Condorcet winners?
> Still a mystery to me.

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