[EM] RWE, Participation
Kevin Venzke
stepjak at yahoo.fr
Wed Sep 10 19:43:03 PDT 2003
Eric,
--- Eric Gorr <eric at ericgorr.net> a écrit :
> >I suspect it could be proven that a voter who uses only two ranks (due to
> >equal ranking) in a method which never rewards order reversal, could never
> >worsen the result from his perspective.
>
> My intuition would say the same thing.
>
> (assume the number of candidates > 3)
>
> However, considering that insincere truncation
> will harm the ability for a method to find the
> group preference by shifting the decision on how
> at least two candidates compare with one another
> when that voter did have a sincere preference
> between them, suggesting that each voter only
> rank two candidates does not appear to be a good
> option.
First, that last phrase is not what I was suggesting. I meant that a voter
would group all candidates into two groups, not that he would rank two
candidates. The value I see in this is that the voter cannot make the result
any worse than he has braced himself beforehand to accept. (This is equivalent
to the situation in Approval: Your vote can't make someone win whom you didn't
approve.)
It's not that I would encourage voters to do this, it's that a voter COULD
do this if they were concerned about their vote spoiling the result. So
what I am saying is that a method should permit this approval-style voting
to work.
Kevin Venzke
stepjak at yahoo.fr
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