[EM] Query for Approval advocates

[Bart Ingles]

Kislanko wrote:
>
> bartman writes:
> 
> > >>(1) Round number fallacy:  The 50% figure is viewed as magical
> > because
> > >>it has the appearance of being a "natural" threshold.  Which it
> > is--if
> > >>there are only two candidates. [...]


> First, the >50% IS a magic threshold, if the term democracy is to mean
> anything. In any two-alternative selection process with more than 2
> voters, the majority criterion is decisive. The difficulty that

I refer you to my first paragraph, above (2nd sentence).  There is also
a "first-choice majority" criteria which seems defensible, to the effect
that if one candidate happens to receive a majority of first choice
votes, then that candidate should win.  But if you have three candidates
and no first-choice majority, then neither of the above flavors of
'majority' is applicable.  


> Condercet observed is that for three candidates the majorities that
> prefer one candidate to another can overlap in such a way that most
> prefer A over B, most prefer B over C, and most prefer C over A.

Actually, when Condorcet was writing, the term 'majority' probably meant
what we now call 'plurality'.  Thus it is possible that a Condorcet
winner can fail to have majority support in the modern sense (defined as
> 50% of the electorate) over any candidate, even in the absence of a cycle or
tie.  If there is a Condorcet winner though, the CW will be preferred by
a
plurality over any of the other candidates.

Bart